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Abstract
We argue that algorithmic modeling is a powerful approach to understanding the collective dynamics of human behavior.
We consider the task of pairing up individuals connected over a network, according to the following model: each individual
is able to propose to match with and accept a proposal from a neighbor in the network; if a matched individual proposes to
another neighbor or accepts another proposal, the current match will be broken; individuals can only observe whether their
neighbors are currently matched but have no knowledge of the network topology or the status of other individuals; and all
individuals have the common goal of maximizing the total number of matches. By examining the experimental data, we
identify a behavioral principle called prudence, develop an algorithmic model, analyze its properties mathematically and by
simulations, and validate the model with human subject experiments for various network sizes and topologies. Our results
include i) a 1=2-approximate maximum matching is obtained in logarithmic time in the network size for bounded degree
networks; ii) for any constant Ew0, a (1{E)-approximate maximum matching is obtained in polynomial time, while
obtaining a maximum matching can require an exponential time; and iii) convergence to a maximum matching is slower on
preferential attachment networks than on small-world networks. These results allow us to predict that while humans can
find a ‘‘good quality’’ matching quickly, they may be unable to find a maximum matching in feasible time. We show that the
human subjects largely abide by prudence, and their collective behavior is closely tracked by the above predictions.
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Introduction
The modeling and prediction of collective human behavior has
been one of the key challenges of social sciences for several
decades. As early as 1947, Herbert Simon argued that information
processing constitutes the core of human decision-making [1]. A
corollary of his argument is that human decision-making processes
can be modeled algorithmically. However, such algorithmic model-
ing and prediction is challenging, considering that collective
decision-making processes are driven by both individual attitudes
and collective dynamics, and often involve social interchange and
mutual agreement.
This paper argues that despite the inherent complexity of
human social interactions, it is possible to isolate basic behavioral
principles, formulate mathematical models, and predict collective
dynamics, using an algorithmic approach. As a simple example of
this approach, in the context of a distributed coordination game
on networks (i.e., the maximum matching game), we present an
algorithmic model of human behavior that is based on simple
principles of local interaction and that is able to capture complex
collective coordination.
Our approach is similar in spirit to the one in physics where
particle systems and cellular automata described by simple rules
are known to generate complex behaviors, such as phase
transitions and universal computability [2–5]. However, our
algorithmic modeling approach embeds individual interaction
behavior as part of a distributed computing system and leads to
computational complexity analysis.
Our work is influenced by the work of Kearns et al. [6] who
studied the effect of network topology on subjects’ ability to color a
graph, and by subsequent work in the context of distributed
coloring and consensus games [7–10]. However, our focus is on
algorithmic modeling and analysis, rather than on observing the
effect of network topology on performance.
We have conducted over 250 experiments with human subjects
on a pool of over 80 networks with up to 24 nodes each, ranging
from simple networks to more complex stochastic models
including preferential attachment [11,12] and small-world net-
works [13]. Our experimental set-up is simple. Subjects are
represented by nodes of a network with edges representing
potential matches. In our experiments, human subjects are
connected over a virtual network and interact with their neighbors
through a computer interface, see Figure 1. Subjects can form and
destroy pairs with their neighbors, and each subject can be part of
a single pair at a time. Subjects are given only local information
about their immediate neighbors, and can only interact with them.
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They are able to propose to match with a neighbor and accept a
proposal from a neighbor. While matched, a subject can also make
a proposal to or accept a proposal from another neighbor; in both
cases, the existing match would automatically be broken.
Moreover, a subject can only have a single outstanding proposal
at a time. Therefore, at any time, a subject can either be part of a
matched pair, or not be matched and have at most a single
outstanding proposal. Subjects are equally incentivized to achieve
a maximum matching, namely to form the maximum number of
disjoint mutual pairs, without regard to whom is matched with
whom. Specifically, they are given an equal monetary reward for
each game where a maximum matching is found within the
allotted time.
To better understand this setup, consider the following
metaphor: imagine that incoming graduate students are pairing
up with faculty members. Further imagine that every member of
the department prefers every graduate student to have one adviser
and every adviser to have one graduate student, and only certain
faculty and graduate students share interests. Communication is
limited so that individuals can only tell if members with whom
they share an interest are already matched. Each member of the
department is now a node, the edges represent shared interest, and
individuals can then propose to work with members with whom
they share an edge.
Our algorithmic model is based on a simple property that we
call ‘‘prudence’’ and that emerges from the analysis of a first set of
experimental data. This property states that individuals do not break
existing matched pairs unless they receive an alternative proposal by an
unmatched neighbor. Based on this property, we propose a simple
distributed algorithm, analyze its performance, validate the model
with additional experimental results, and predict outcomes. The
prudence property is reminiscent of the notion of risk aversion, a
relevant topic in the economics literature [14,15].
We now briefly summarize our findings. Throughout the paper
we use the graph-theoretic terminology, according to which a
matching is a set of edges without common nodes. The size of a
matching is the number of edges in it. A maximum matching is a
matching with the largest size. For 0vcƒ1, a matching is a c-
approximate maximum matching if its size is within a factor of c
from that of a maximum matching. A matchingM is maximal if it
is not a proper subset of any other matching, i.e., for any new edge
added to it, it is no longer a matching. Figure 2 depicts an
approximate and a maximum matching of a network. We show
that the convergence time to the maximum matching in computer
simulations of the prudence algorithm fits well the experimental
data (after scaling by a constant factor), see Figures 3 and 4. By
computer simulations we also predict that convergence to a
maximum matching is slower on preferential attachment networks
than on small-world networks, see Figure 5. This prediction is
validated by our experiments with human subjects. It is also in
agreement with the experimental results by Kearns et al. [6]
regarding the coloring problem, and with the theoretical results by
Montanari and Saberi [16] regarding the spread of innovation in
networks. On the theoretical side, we analyze the dynamics of the
prudence algorithm and show that for all graphs of bounded
degree a 1=2-approximate maximum matching is reached quickly, on
average in O( log n) rounds, where n refers to the number of nodes
in the network (Theorem 1); and for all graphs a (1{E)-approximate
maximum matching is reached in polynomially many rounds with
high probability (Theorem 2). We also show that there are
instances (called ‘‘bad’’ graphs) for which reaching a maximum
matching requires exponential time with high probability when
starting from a set of configurations (called ‘‘bad’’ matchings)
which constitute almost all possible configurations (Theorems 3
and 4). These results show that in the worst case there is an
exponential gap between reaching a good matching (i.e., an
approximate maximum matching whose cardinality is close to a
maximum matching) versus the best (i.e., perfect) matching. The
experimental data shows (consistently with the theoretical analysis)
that human subjects always find a ‘‘good’’ matching quickly, while
they can take much longer to improve the solution to a maximum
matching, see Figure 6. In particular, on the bad graph, human
subjects could not converge to a maximum matching in the
allotted time.
Related Literature
The experimental study of human strategic behavior over
networks is a topic of great current interest in the literature. The
work by Kearns and others on network coloring and consensus
games [6–10] has been particularly influential. Judd et al. [17]
investigated how subjects choose between playing either a
dominant or a submissive role in a network game, documenting
the importance of fairness. Kearns et al. [18] performed
experiments on network formation games when there is a cost
for creating links. Suri and Watts [19] conducted experiments in
which individuals connected over networks play local public good
games. Wang et al. [20] studied multi-player prisoner’s dilemma
games in which subjects can propose and delete links to other
players, showing that partner selection increases cooperation.
Brautbar and Kearns [21] introduced a network formation game
in which players need to maximize their clustering coefficients.
Compared to these previous works, we focus on isolating
Figure 1. Computer interface. The subject is matched with the node
on the right and is being requested by three unmatched nodes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041900.g001
Figure 2. Approximate and maximum matching. Left: an
approximate maximum matching of size 5 on a network with 12 nodes
(matching edges are represented in bold red, matched nodes are
colored, unmatched nodes are white). Right: a maximum matching of
size 6 on the same network (note that the maximum matching is also a
perfect matching, as all nodes are matched).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041900.g002
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behavioral principles of human interaction (in the context of
maximum matching games) and using these principles to
formulate algorithmic predictions of outcomes.
As social interaction naturally induces strategic behavior, our
work is also closely related to game theory. Indeed, several authors
proposed game theoretical models of human interaction over
social networks. Topics vary from diffusion and contagion over
networks [16,22,23] to strategic information retrieval [24,25],
models of segregation [26] and bargaining over networks [27], to
mention a few. The main element that distinguishes our work from
the game theory literature is that we focus on the algorithmic
processes involved in strategic thinking and the ensuing collective
dynamics rather than on equilibria. Moreover, our algorithmic
model is motivated and supported by experimental data.
Finally, matching theory has received notable attention
throughout the decades, both in the context of game theory and
economics [28–31], and in the development of algorithms for the
maximum matching problem [32–36]. We point out that our
simplified setup constitutes a simplification of the richness and
heterogeneity of the ties in real social networks, as the subjects
have no preference over each other, all the ties are equivalent, and
interaction has no cost. However, such a simplified model leads to
a tractable analysis and to the formulation of a general principle of
collective behavior.
Methods
The experiments included the interaction of the participants
through a computer interface, and were conducted in accordance
with the ethical standards specified in the 1964 declaration of
Helsinki. Written consent was granted before participation in the
experiments. Our institutional review boards approved this study
(UCSD IRB approval 111213SX, US Army Human Research
Protection Office ARO-HRPO Log A-17038).
The Matching Games
Before formulating our algorithmic model, we conducted four
sessions of experiments, each with a different pool of sixteen
undergraduate students connected over a virtual network.
Subsequently, to validate our model, we ran an additional session
of experiments with a pool of twenty four subjects on a set of
networks that included small world and preferential attachment
networks. In each of the first four sessions the subjects were asked
to solve the matching game on a pool of over 70 networks. All
networks admitted a perfect matching, namely a maximum matching
with no unmatched nodes. We considered networks classified into
four groups: bipartite networks admitting a unique perfect
matching, bipartite networks admitting multiple perfect match-
ings, non-bipartite networks admitting a unique perfect matching,
non-bipartite networks admitting multiple perfect matchings.
Figure 3. Affinity between humans’ and algorithm’s performance, 16-node networks. The performance of the human subjects (red points
joined by continuous line) and of the algorithm (blue points) over eight bipartite 16-node networks (triangles) and eight non-bipartite 16-node
networks (circles) are plotted. The experiment was run multiple times on each network and the average behavior is reported. The x-axis shows the
indexes of the networks sorted by increasing average time required to reach a maximum matching. Bipartite networks are labeled from 1 to 8, while
non-bipartite networks are labeled from 9 to 16. The y-axis shows the average time (in seconds) required to reach a maximum matching for humans,
while the average number of rounds of the algorithm is scaled by a constant factor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041900.g003
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Within each group, networks were randomly generated. As a
remark, a bipartite network is a network whose nodes can be
divided into two disjoint sets V1 and V2 such that every edge
connects a vertex in V1 to one in V2. If this property does not hold,
we say that the network is non-bipartite. Subjects sat in front of
workstations for the entire two-hour duration of the session and
had no eye-contact with each other. For each matching game, a
network was chosen, subjects were randomly assigned to its nodes,
and each subject interacted with its neighbors by making or
accepting proposals to form matched pairs using the interface
shown in Figure 1. Each subject could control the node in the
center of the screen and could only see its neighbors and, among
those, distinguish which of them were currently matched (marked
in dark green). A subject could make proposals or accept proposals
by selecting a neighbor with a mouse click, and could only have
one outstanding proposal at a time to form a matched pair (circled
in yellow). While subjects knew whether a neighbor is matched or
unmatched, they did not have direct knowledge of any outstanding
requests to their neighbors other than their own. If two neighbors
selected each other, a pair was formed (a bright green link
appeared between them) which could be broken when one of the
partners selected another neighbor. As a remark, since a pair was
formed when two subjects selected each other and each subject
could make a single selection at a time, each subject could be part
of a single pair at a time (with one of its neighbors).
If a perfect matching was found within the time limit of five
minutes, the game was declared solved and each participant was
rewarded by $.50 or $1 depending on the session, otherwise the
game ended with no reward. The number of games in an
experimental session was not fixed, but games were run for the
two-hour duration of the session. Therefore, the number of games
and the cumulative reward in a session depended on the
performance of the participants, providing an additional incentive
to coordinate.
The networks used in this first set of experiments can be divided
into four classes: bipartite, non bipartite, unique perfect matching,
multiple perfect matchings. Two one-tailed Welch’s t-tests
confirmed the hypotheses that it is harder for humans to complete
the matching game on non-bipartite than on bipartite networks (p-
value v0:001); and that non-bipartite networks with unique
perfect matching are more difficult to solve than non-bipartite
networks with multiple perfect matchings (p-value v0:001). No
statistically significant difference was found between the comple-
tion time of bipartite networks with unique and with multiple
perfect matchings. We believe that this depended on the small
network size of sixteen nodes and we did not explore larger
bipartite networks further.
The Algorithmic Model
One of the main behavioral properties that emerged from the
experimental data is that matched players may break their current
matching only if they have been requested by an unmatched
neighbor. In particular, in 30% of the games no player ever
violated this rule at any time during the game. In the remaining
games, over 93% percent of the moves were in agreement with this
rule. Therefore, this property led to the following modeling
assumption:
Assumption 1 (Prudence) A matched node does not break its
current matched pair if it does not receive any request from other neighbors.
Two remarks are in order. First, note that this behavioral rule is
peculiar to the matching problem since each player needs to
choose a partner but also needs to be chosen. Second, notice that a
matched subject with unmatched neighbors has some incentive to
behave non-prudently and break the current match, because the
subject can infer from the status of its neighbors that the perfect
matching is not reached yet. However, experimental data shows
that this rarely happens.
For each node u, let f (u) indicate u’s current preference. In
other words, f (u) is the unique node to which u has currently
proposed to. f (u) will be null if u does not have a current proposal.
If two neighbors u and v currently prefer each other (i.e., u~f (v)
and v~f (u)), then consider them matched and the edge e~fu,vg
as part of the matching. Assume that each node knows if a
neighbor is matched or unmatched.
Given the prudence property, we model the algorithmic
behavior of humans using the PRUDENCE algorithm shown
in Table 1. The algorithm is specified by the implementation of
two functions, called MATCHEDCHOOSE(u) and
UNMATCHEDCHOOSE(u), which are placeholders for the
behavior that node u would follow depending on whether u is
matched or unmatched. We consider a synchronous setting, in
which time is divided into rounds, and at the beginning of each
round each node observes its status and the status of its
neighborhood and then decides on an action to take.
In the following we provide a canonical implementation
of the functions UNMATCHEDCHOOSE(u) and
MATCHEDCHOOSE(u) consistent with the prudence property.
UNMATCHEDCHOOSE(u) does not change the current value
of f (u) with probability p, while with probability 1{p accepts the
proposal from a neighbor uniformly at random from among the
neighbors v with f (v)~u if any; if there is no neighbor v with
f (v)~u, then it proposes to a node uniformly at random from
Figure 4. Affinity between humans’ and algorithm’s perfor-
mance, 24-node networks. The performance of the human subjects
(red points joined by continuous line) and of the algorithm (blue points)
over different 24-node networks are plotted. In particular, small-world
networks (triangles), a ring network (diamonds), and preferential
attachment networks (circles) were tested. The experiment was run
multiple times on each network and the average behavior is reported.
The x-axis shows the indexes of the networks sorted by increasing
average time required to reach a maximum matching. The y-axis shows
the average time (in seconds) required to reach a maximum matching
for humans, while the average number of rounds of the algorithm is
scaled by a constant factor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041900.g004
An Algorithmic Model of Human Matching Behavior
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among the unmatched neighbors if any; otherwise it proposes to a
node uniformly at random from among all the matched neighbors.
In other words, unmatched nodes prefer neighbors who requested
them over other unmatched neighbors, and unmatched neighbors
over matched neighbors. As for matched nodes,
MATCHEDCHOOSE(u) accepts a proposal from a neighbor
uniformly at random from among the neighbors v with f (v)~u
(note that u’s current partner is one of them). We remark that the
simulations’ performance and the fit with the experimental data
was practically insensitive to the value of p chosen in the run of the
algorithm.
Results
Mathematical Results
In this section we present our analytical results regarding the
convergence behavior of the PRUDENCE algorithm. In particular,
our results describe how well the algorithm performs in finding a
large matching and the time it takes in terms of the number of
rounds required. Due to space constraints, we only present proof
sketches here. Complete details of the proofs are deferred to the SI.
We define a matching at round t as the set of matched edges at
the beginning of round t of the algorithm. We first claim that the
prudence property implies that the size of the matching does not
decrease with time. The proof is immediate and it is omitted.
Claim 1 The size of the matching at round t is non-decreasing as t
increases.
We then observe that the behavior of the PRUDENCE algorithm
can be described by a Markov chain over matchings. A transition
from a matchingM to a matchingM ’ is made by selecting an edge
e~fu,vg such that at least one among u and v is unmatched, and
setting M ’~Mze if u,v are both unmatched, and
M ’~Mze{e’ if exactly one of u and v is matched in M and
e’ is the matching edge. This Markov chain is reversible when
restricted to matchings of the same size. Since the Markov chain is
memory-less and has positive probability of reaching a maximum
matching, we conclude that the PRUDENCE algorithm enjoys self-
stabilization.
Claim 2 The PRUDENCE algorithm is a self-stabilizing algorithm.
Our first theorem says that a 1=2-approximate matching will be
reached quickly in networks with bounded degree.
Theorem 1 In any bounded-degree graph on n nodes, the expected
number of rounds for the PRUDENCE algorithm to reach a 1=2-
approximate matching is O( log n).
The key idea of the proof is to show that, in expectation, the
‘‘distance’’ in terms of number of matched pairs to the smallest
maximal matching shrinks by a constant factor in each round of the
PRUDENCE algorithm. Since it is well known that any maximal
matching is a 1=2-approximation of the maximum matching, the
result then follows.
We remark that the assumption of having bounded degrees is
necessary as there are unbounded degree graphs in which a
polynomial number of rounds is required with high probability to
achieve a 1=2-approximation. However, in this case, a polynomial
number of rounds is also enough to achieve any constant
Figure 5. Algorithm’s asymptotic performance. Prudence algorithm’s performance with respect to the network’s size for the ‘‘bad’’ graph Gn
(black diamonds), for preferential attachment model (green squares), small-world model (red triangles). For each generative model and network size
we generated 100 networks and run the algorithm 1000 times on each. The average behavior is reported. The x-axis shows the network size, and the
y-axis shows the average number of rounds required by the algorithm to converge to a maximum matching.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041900.g005
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approximation: indeed, as the next theorem states, the Prudence
algorithm provides a PTAS (polynomial time approximation
scheme) for the maximum matching problem. Given a graph G, D
denotes its maximum degree.
Theorem 2 For any graph G of n nodes, Ew0 and c§1=2, the
PRUDENCE algorithm reaches a (1{E)-approximate matching in
c
E
nD2=E
rounds with probability at least 1{ exp ({cE2n=2).
The theorem implies that, for any constant Ew0, a matching
whose size is within a (1{E) fraction of the size of the maximum
matching is reached in polynomial time. For bounded-degree
graphs, this result also holds for E~V(1= log n), implying that in
this case a maximum matching can be reached in polynomial time.
To prove the theorem, we track the progress of the algorithm
towards an approximate maximum matching, using the concept of
an augmenting path. An augmenting path is a path of odd length
which alternates between matched and unmatched edges and
whose extreme edges are unmatched. It turns out that there is a
close connection between the size of a shortest augmenting path in
a matching and how close the matching size is to the size of a
maximum matching. More specifically, we use the following
lemma due to Hopcroft and Karp [32].
Lemma 1 Consider any matching M that does not admit augmenting
paths of odd length k or smaller. Then, the size of M is at least a fraction
kz1
kz3
of the size of a maximum matching.
Hence, to prove Theorem 2, we need to show that short
augmenting paths (for a suitably chosen k) are solved in a short
amount of time. It is useful to consider a particle analogy to
understand the process that eliminates short augmenting paths.
We consider each unmatched node as a particle. Particles move
around the graph from node to node as nodes change their status
between matched and unmatched states dictated by the random
choices in the algorithm. There are exactly two particles along an
augmenting path, situated at the extreme nodes. To understand
how an augmenting path gets shorter and eventually vanishes, we
consider how the two particles move closer to each other along the
path.
Figure 6. Experimental performance, 24-node networks. Performance of the experimental subjects on networks of 24 nodes. The plot shows
the time to reach a perfect matching of size 12 (red), an approximate matching of size 11 (a 0:92–approximate matching, in blue) and a matching of
size 6 (a 1=2–approximate matching, in green). Results for single games are reported. The x-axis shows the indexes of the games sorted by increasing
solving time, while the y-axis shows the time in seconds. The right-most four games on the red plot did not converge to a maximum matching and
correspond to three instances of the ‘‘bad’’ graph Gn and to one instance of the preferential attachment network.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041900.g006
Table 1. The algorithm.
if unmatched
Set f (u)/UNMATCHEDCHOOSE(u)
else if matched and A neighbor v s.t. f (v)~u
Set f (u)/MATCHEDCHOOSE(u)
end
PRUDENCE algorithm for node u.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041900.t001
An Algorithmic Model of Human Matching Behavior
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Let u0,u1,u2,    ,u‘ denote a shortest augmenting path. If the
extreme unmatched node u0 proposes to u1 and u1 accepts the
proposal breaking the current match with u2, then the particle
moves from u0 to u2. A similar argument applies to the other end
of the path. Also, the minimality of the path guarantees that the
internal nodes do not change their current matching as they have
no unmatched neighbor. It follows that the particles become closer
to each other and the augmenting path gets shorter. Using this
approach, we can prove that with suitable probability the length of
the shortest augmenting path shrinks after each round. When an
augmenting path becomes an edge (that is, a path of length one),
and if the extreme unmatched nodes select each other as partners,
the particles and the path vanish, yielding an increment to the size
of the matching. Hence, a key step of our proof is to lower bound
the probability that an augmenting path of length k vanishes, and
then to apply Lemma 1 to relate the existing augmenting paths
and the matching size.
We remark that the random process governing the movement of
the particles in the network is not a classical random walk over the
nodes of the graph. Indeed, if that were the case, a maximum
matching would always be reached in polynomial time by a simple
cat-and-mouse argument. Instead, a random move of a particle
depends on the current matching, which in turn changes when the
particle moves. This modest difference can lead to an exponential
time gap between convergence to an approximate matching and
convergence to a maximum matching. Indeed, exploiting the
dependence of the particles’ movements on the current matching,
we show that there is a family of graphs for which the Prudence
algorithm takes exponentially many rounds with high probability
to reach a maximum matching starting from a set of configurations
that cover almost all possible cases. This family of ‘‘bad’’ graphs is
defined as follows (see also Figure 7).
Definition 1 (Bad graph Gn) The bipartite graph
Gn~(A|B,E) has 4n nodes A~fa1, . . . ,a2ng and
B~fb1, . . . ,b2ng, and its edges are (anz1,bn), (ai,bj) for all 1ƒiƒn
and 1ƒjƒi, and (ai,bj) for all nz1ƒiƒ2n and nz1ƒjƒi.
Note that the set of ‘‘horizontal’’ edges (ai,bi), for 1ƒiƒ2n is
the unique perfect matching for Gn.
Theorem 3 The PRUDENCE algorithm requires 2V(n= log
2 n) many
rounds with high probability to reach the perfect matching when starting from
any (2n{1)-matching in which the two unmatched nodes are in opposite sides
of Gn.
The main idea of the proof is to track the positions of the
unmatched nodes throughout the course of the algorithm and to
lower bound the number of rounds needed before they meet as an
adjacent pair.
We first prove a one-to-one correspondence between the
Markov process of the state evolution between matchings and a
classical random walk on a tree (represented in Figure S1) whose
size is exponential in n. We show that this classical random walk
takes exponential time to reach the root of the tree starting at any
one of its nodes, thus providing a lower bound on the convergence
time of the PRUDENCE algorithm.
We say that a matching M of Gn of size 2n{1 is bad if the
PRUDENCE algorithm requires exponentially many rounds with
high probability to converge to the perfect matching when starting
fromM. Observe that all matchings considered by Theorem 3 are
bad. The following theorem states that almost all matchings of size
2n{1 are bad.
Theorem 4 The ratio between the number of ‘‘bad’’ matchings and the
number of all (2n{1)-matchings of Gn is 1{O(2
{n).
Theorems 3 and 4 show that the PRUDENCE algorithm
requires exponentially many rounds to converge to the perfect
matching of Gn when starting from a set of configurations (the bad
matchings) constituting almost all possible cases (the matchings of
size 2n{1).
Validation
Figure 3 compares the performance of the human subjects (red)
with that of simulations (blue) on a set of 16-node networks (8
bipartite networks and 8 non-bipartite networks) with unique
perfect matchings. The networks are sorted by increasing average
completion time, and as a result bipartite networks are labeled
from 1 to 8, while non-bipartite networks are labeled from 9 to 16.
Each of these networks was tested at least 6 times over all sessions.
The vertical axis represents the time (in seconds), and the
numerical values of the convergence time of the algorithm are
scaled by a constant factor to best match the experimental data.
In an additional experimental session, we tested twenty four
subjects connected over small-world, preferential attachment and
ring networks as well as over the ‘‘bad’’ graph Gn. The games on
the bad graph were never solved, consistent with the prediction of
exponentially slow convergence. Furthermore, we found that
preferential attachment networks were more difficult to solve than
small-world networks (one-tailed Welch’s t-test, p-value v0:01).
Figure 4 shows the affinity between humans’ (red) and algorithm’s
(blue) performance, on this set of 24-node networks: small-world
networks (triangles), ring network (diamonds), preferential attach-
ment networks (circles). The x-axis shows the indices of the
networks sorted by increasing average time to find the perfect
matching, and the y-axis shows the average time.
Figure 5 shows, by simulation, that the algorithm scales linearly
in the size of the network in the case of small-world networks [13],
while it scales polynomially for preferential attachment networks
[11,12], and exponentially on the ‘‘bad’’ graph Gn. These results
closely resemble the experimental data of the coloring games
performed by Kearns et al. [6], where preferential attachment
networks resulted in the worst performance among all tested
networks, while small-worlds networks appeared to be much easier
to solve.
Figure 6 shows the performance of the experimental subjects on
networks of 24 nodes, each admitting a perfect matching. In
Figure 7. The bad graph. The ‘‘bad’’ graph Gn for n~3. One of the
‘‘bad’’ matchings of Theorem 3 is highlighted in red.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041900.g007
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particular, it reports results for single games, and it compares the
time to reach a perfect matching of size 12 (red), an approximate
matching of size 11 (a 0:92-approximate matching, in blue) and a
matching of size 6 (a 1=2-approximate matching, in green) in each
game. The x-axis shows the indexes of the games sorted by
increasing solution time, while the y-axis shows time in seconds.
The plot shows (consistent with the theoretical analysis) that a 1=2-
approximate matching is reached almost immediately in all games,
an almost maximum matching is reached quickly, while reaching a
perfect matching can take a large amount of time.
Discussion
While it is challenging to characterize the strategies used by
humans in performing even simple social tasks, as they may
depend on diverse individual cognitive and psychological attitudes,
we argue that it is possible to isolate simple behavioral invariants of
individual behavior, which are useful for algorithmic modeling,
analysis and prediction of collective dynamics of coordination.
To illustrate our approach, we have focused on a simple
matching game over networks and presented a combination of
theoretical, experimental, and simulation results. From the
experiments, we identified the prudence property as a common
behavioral invariant of human subjects when they coordinate to
find a maximum matching. We proposed an algorithm as model of
human behavior and showed that it can successfully predict
dynamics of coordination.
We have shown that our approach is able to uncover basic
behavioral properties that may not be apparent from off-line
surveys. Indeed, when subjects were asked to report on their
strategies in post-experimental surveys, we obtained a list of
diverse strategies, including: choose a partner and never disengage
from it, always accept proposals from neighbors, try to change
partner if the game is not solved for a while. Moreover, our results
demonstrate that algorithmic modeling and the mathematical
analysis of algorithms can be useful in systematically predicting the
aggregate behavior and in deriving results that hold for any graph,
or for a large family of graphs. This general conclusions cannot be
derived rigorously form experimental observations and computer
simulations.
Our work suggests further research in several directions. A
natural question is whether non-prudent behavior by a subset of
the nodes can help. In a preliminary investigation, we have
evaluated the performance of a variant of our algorithm where a
subset of nodes behave non-prudently with a positive probability.
In our simulations, these populations do not offer significant
improvement in terms of finding a maximum matching. Further-
more, populations entirely composed of non-prudent nodes seem
to perform poorly. In other words, a group of aggressive and risk-
taking individuals might not achieve coordination easily.
Our PRUDENCE algorithm is memoryless. It is an interesting
question as to what extent human subjects use memory in
distributed games, and how memory could be incorporated in
modeling human strategies. In an initial attempt to study this, we
implemented a variant of the PRUDENCE algorithm in which a
node remembers its recent history and gives less preference to
neighbors who recently rejected it. In simulations on preferential
attachment and small world networks, memory did not result in
significant improvement over the memoryless case. Furthermore,
simulations show that making decisions based on events in a
distant past (that is, tracking events that happened in a distant past)
might hurt performance. A careful investigation of the role of
memory in human strategies in distributed games is of fundamen-
tal interest.
Regarding the incentives, in our matching games each subject
obtains the same reward when a maximum matching is reached,
regardless of the chosen partner. How does the introduction of
preferences affect the overall coordination? Preferences could be
‘‘enforced’’ for example by rewarding subjects based on the
partners they match with. There is likely to be a trade-off between
the collective task of finding a maximum matching and the
individual profit maximization.
As a final remark, the proposed Prudence algorithm constitutes
a possible reasonable explanation of human coordination behavior
in the distributed matching game. Apart from the simple variations
mentioned above, we did not test how well other alternative
algorithmic models could fit the experimental data.
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